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Abstract
This paper proposes several time preference specifications that generalise quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting, while retaining its analytical tractability. We define their discount functions and provide
a recursive formulation of the implied lifetime payoﬀs. A calibration exercise demonstrates that
these specifications deliver better approximations to true hyperbolic discounting. We characterise
the Markov-perfect equilibrium of a general intra-personal game of agents with various time pref-
erences. When applied to specific economic examples, our proposals yield policies that are close
to those of true hyperbolic discounters. Furthermore, these approximations can be used in set-
tings where an exact solution for hyperbolic agents is not available. Finally, we suggest further
generalisations which would provide an even better fit.
Keywords: hyperbolic discounting, approximations, intra-personal games
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1 Introduction
Decision-making often involves trade-oﬀs between costs and benefits at diﬀerent points in time.
To explore these trade-oﬀs and gain insight into intertemporal choices, economic theory introduces
the concept of time preferences. The existing literature has considered numerous approaches to
evaluating and comparing payoﬀs in dynamic settings. My paper contributes to this literature by
proposing time preference specifications which deliver a better fit to experimental and empirical
evidence while retaining analytical tractability.
The most popular framework for analysing intertemporal problems is that of discounted utility
theory (Samuelson, 1937). This approach is also known as “exponential discounting”. It has been
very popular in economic research, as it oﬀers analytical convenience and yields optimal plans
that are time consistent. However, there are many situations in which human behaviour cannot
be explained with exponential discounting. In fact, multiple studies agree that, in the real world,
agents’ preferences exhibit “present bias” or “increasing patience”. In particular, people are more
patient regarding intertemporal trade-oﬀs that are further in the future. Such preferences imply a
discrepancy between the objectives of the current decision maker and his future selves. As a result,
the plan that is currently deemed optimal would be subject to change if commitment technologies
are not available. In such an environment, the ability to commit to future actions is valuable, as it
can increase lifetime payoﬀs.
There is vast evidence in support of increasing patience. In experiments, this phenomenon
often manifests as “preference reversal”: subjects change their preferences with the advancement of
time. Chung and Herrnstein (1961) observed that some aspects of animal behaviour are consistent
with present bias. Their results were later extended to human subjects as well (see Ainslie (1992)
for a survey). These experiments have been carried out with a wide range of real rewards. For
example, Millar and Navarick (1984) studied the eﬀects of videogames as a positive reinforcer.
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They performed two experiments involving a choice of selecting between longer or shorter periods of
access to a videogame. The first experiment showed that immediate reinforcement was preferred to
delayed reinforcement while, in the second, preference for the shorter delay decreased, possibly due
to“preference reversal”. Christensen-Szalanski (1984) examined the attitudes of 18 pregnant women
toward avoiding pain and avoiding anesthesia. The women preferred to avoid using anesthesia
during childbirth when asked one month before labour and during early labour. However, during
active labour their preferences shifted toward avoiding pain. Green, Fry and Myerson (1994)
studied three age groups: children, young adults and older adults. Subjects in each age group
had to choose between immediate and delayed hypothetical monetary rewards. The amount of the
delayed reward was held constant while its delay was varied. All three age groups showed delayed
discounting, with the rate of discounting being highest for children and lowest for older adults. For
further experimental research on time discounting see Frederick, Loewentstein and O’Donoghue
(2002).
Over the years, there have been multiple proposals of discounting models that incorporate
increasing patience (Ainslie, 1975; Mazur, 1987). Probably the most general specification was
suggested by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). It captures the other proposals as special cases, and
is thus referred to as “generalised hyperbolic discounting”. Moreover, Loewenstein and Prelec are
able to provide axiomatic foundations for their approach. They postulate that the delay necessary to
compensate a decision maker for a larger outcome is a linear function of the time to a smaller, earlier
outcome. The authors show that this assumption is satisfied only by the generalised hyperbolic
discount function.
While true hyperbolic preferences provide a good fit to real-world data and experimental evi-
dence, they do pose substantial analytical challenges. Specifically, they are not amenable to analysis
with standard techniques such as dynamic programming. Moreover, lifetime payoﬀs of agents with
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such preferences are often infinite, implying a lack of interior solutions. To avoid these diﬃculties,
the existing literature often assumes an alternative specification knows as “quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting”. It was first proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in the context of an inter-generational
bequest game. Later, Laibson used these preferences to approximate true hyperbolic discounting
(Laibson, 1997; Laibson, 1998).
In essence, quasi-hyperbolic discounting specifies a lower discount factor only for the trade-oﬀ
between today and tomorrow. For all other future adjacent trade-oﬀs, the discount factor is constant
from the current point of view. The quasi-hyperbolic formulation is analytically convenient, as it
permits recursive formulation of intertemporal problems. Furthermore, it does exhibit a form of
increasing patience: agents with these preferences are more impatient about immediate trade-
oﬀs (i.e. today versus tomorrow) as opposed to trade-oﬀs that will happen in the distant future.
However, a shortcoming of quasi-hyperbolic discounting is that it gives rise a discontinuous break
between the “short run” and the “long run”. That is, it does not generate a discount factor that is
gradually increasing over time. Instead, discounting eﬀectively becomes exponential from tomorrow
onward.
In this paper, we build on the pioneering contribution of Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson
(1997) by proposing several generalisations of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. These generalisations
still allow us to formulate the decision makers’ problems recursively, and thus to characterise in-
tertemporal choices with standard dynamic programming techniques. In addition, our formulations
nest quasi-hyperbolic preferences as a special case. This guarantees that they will always provide
better approximations to true hyperbolic discounting. Our first proposal yields an eﬀective dis-
count factor that increases over the first two consecutive trade-oﬀs, whilst our second proposal
exhibits decreasing impatience over the entire planning horizon. The superior goodness of fit of
these approximations is demonstrated with a calibration exercise.
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We then show that our generalisations may have non-trivial repercussions for several economic
applications. To do so, we first study the Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) of a general intra-
personal game between the current and future selves of a sophisticated decision maker. We apply
the analysis of this general setting to two specific economic problems: i) Laibson’s consumption-
saving model (Laibson, 1998) and ii) smoking and internality taxes (Gruber and Koszegi, 2001).
In these applications, the equilibria with true hyperbolic discounters can be solved for explicitly
(Calcott and Petkov, 2015). We compare them to the equilibria that would arise under the various
approximations of true hyperbolic discounting, and show that our proposals yields policies that are
much closer to the benchmark.
Next we consider two extensions in which the analysis of Calcott and Petkov (2015) is not
applicable. In the first, consumer utility incorporates Markovian uncertainty and in the second,
payoﬀs are linear-quadratic. These settings violate the assumptions of Calcott and Petkov (2015).
Therefore, it is not possible to obtain exact solutions for agents with true hyperbolic preferences.
However, when used in these frameworks, our generalisations would still yield interior solutions.
We illustrate these solutions with numerical examples.
Finally, we show that our specifications can be generalised further, thus enabling us to attain
an even better approximation to true hyperbolic discounting. However, higher precision comes
at the expense of increased analytical and computational complexity. We describe four such gen-
eralisations, and derive the corresponding Euler equations of the decision maker’s intra-personal
game.
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief overview of
time preferences that are popular in the existing literature, i.e. exponential, true hyperbolic and
quasi-hyperbolic. In Section 3 we propose our first generalisation. We define its discount function
and provide a recursive formulation of the implied lifetime payoﬀs. In Section 4 we introduce
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our second generalisation. We first define it recursively, and then obtain a closed-form solution
for its discount function. Again, we are able to formulate lifetime payoﬀs recursively. Section 5
presents a calibration exercise. We assume that actual discounting is true hyperbolic, and choose
the parameters of the various quasi-hyperbolic approximations to deliver the best fit. The exercise
demonstrates that our proposals yield better approximations. In Section 6 we study a general
intra-personal game with linear state dynamics, and derive equilibrium conditions for agents with
true and quasi-hyperbolic preferences. This analysis is applied to two economic problems in Section
7. We compute their equilibria and show that, when calibrated, our generalisations deliver policies
that are much closer to those implied by true hyperbolic discounting. Section 8 explores a couple
of extensions in which an exact solution for true hyperbolic discounters is not available, but we can
still use our approximations. Section 9 shows how to generalise our proposals further to attain an
even better fit. Finally, Section 10 concludes the thesis.
2 Time preferences considered in the literature
Time preferences can be summarised succinctly with a discount function () :  → [0 1]. A
period- agent who expects to receive a payoﬀ + in period  +  would assign this payoﬀ a
current value of ()+. If faced with a stream of instantaneous payoﬀs  +1 +2 , the
agent’s lifetime payoﬀ from the perspective of period  could be expressed as
(0) +
∞X
=1
()+ .
It is assumed that (0) = 1, and that () is decreasing in  and converging to 0 as  approaches
infinity.
The economic interpretation of the discount function is that it reflects the impatience of the
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decision maker. Note that his eﬀective discount factor for a trade-oﬀ between two successive periods,
+ and ++1, would be given by (+1)() ∈ (0 1). If this ratio is close to zero, this means
that the period- +  payoﬀ is much more important to the decision maker than the period- + +1
payoﬀ. If, on the other hand, ( + 1)() is close to one, then he assigns equal priority to the
two periods.
2.1 Exponential discounting
The standard discounted utility model was proposed by Samuelson (1937). He considered the
following discount function:
0() =  . (1)
Hence, the lifetime payoﬀ of a period- decision maker with these preferences is
  =  +
∞X
=1
+.
This type of discounting is known as exponential discounting. A special feature of this formulation
is that, for any  , we have 0( + 1)0() = .
Exponential discounting has been very popular in the literature for two reasons.
• First, it oﬀers analytical convenience, as it allows for simple recursive formulation of intertem-
poral problems. In particular, the lifetime payoﬀ of a period- agent can be expressed as
  =  +  +1.
On the basis of this representation, Bellman (1952) developed the theory of dynamic pro-
gramming. Using a contraction mapping argument, they were able to prove existence and
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uniqueness of solutions to problems involving intertemporal trade-oﬀs.
• Second, Strotz (1955-1956) showed that only exponential discounting produces optimal plans
that are dynamically consistent. In particular, suppose that an agent is able to recalculate
his optimal plan in a future period subsequent to . If he does not have an incentive to
deviate from the plan originally devised in period , then this plan is said to be dynamically
consistent. To satisfy this property, the trade-oﬀ between two adjacent periods should be
independent of the agent’s viewpoint. That is, ( + 1)() = ( +  + 1)( + ) for
any   . The only discount function which meets this requirement is 0().
2.2 True hyperbolic discounting
The experimental and empirical literature has failed to find extensive support for exponential
preferences. In fact, numerous studies show that there are many types of behaviour which cannot
be explained by exponential discounting. For example, one commonly observed phenomenon is
known as “preference reversal”. That is, people often prefer $100 today to $110 tomorrow, but
$110 in day 31 is preferred to $100 in day 30. Such choices cannot be reconciled with exponential
discounting. Another example is provided by Thaler (1981). Participants in an experiment were
asked how much money is required in 1 month, 1 year and 10 years to make them indiﬀerent to
receiving $15 today. The median answers of the subjects were $20, $50 and $100. Again, these
answers would imply discount factors that change dramatically with the agent’s perspective.
Most of the papers on time preferences argue that the observed data can be explained better
if agents are assumed to have true hyperbolic discounting instead of exponential discounting. The
true hyperbolic discount function was originally defined by Ainslie and Herrnstein (1981) and Mazur
(1987) as follows:
() = 1
1 +  . (2)
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The parameter  reflects the agent’s impatience: the higher , the lower the weight on future
payoﬀs. Later this function was given a more general form, 0() = (1+)−, and was justified
axiomatically by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). A key feature of these formulations is that the
discount factor ( + 1)() between two adjacent periods is gradually increasing in  :
( 0 + 1)( 0)  ( 00 + 1)( 00) for all  0   00.
This feature is known as present bias.1
As pointed out earlier, non-stationarity of the eﬀective discount factors may imply that the
optimal precommitment plan of a hyperbolic decision maker is time inconsistent. In the absence
of commitment technologies, future agents will be tempted to deviate from the plan that was
previously considered optimal. In other words, this decision maker will have a self-control problem.
The literature has considered several approaches to modelling the behaviour of such decision makers.
Our analysis will focus exclusively on sophisticated agents. That is, we assume that agents are aware
of future temptations to deviate and take actions to mitigate them. This view is consistent with
several economic phenomena that are observed in the real world. We will discuss these in detail
in Section 7. Technically, the behaviour of a sophisticated decision maker is modelled as an intra-
personal game between his current and future selves. The subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game
yields a dynamically consistent decision stream.
While true hyperbolic discounting can explain empirical observations, it poses significant ana-
lytical challenges. Specifically, it does not allow for a recursive representation of dynamic problems.
That is, formulating an equation that defines an agent’s lifetime payoﬀ through itself is infeasible.
Moreover, representing these payoﬀs with value functions in infinite-horizon settings is problematic.
1Note that exponential discounters are not present-biased, as their eﬀective discount factor is always constant.
10
The eﬀective discount factor between adjacent periods implied by (2) approaches 1 as the length of
the planning horizon increases: →∞( + 1)() = 1. This suggests that lifetime payoﬀs
are typically infinite.2
2.3 Order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting
The existing literature often circumvents the aforementioned technical diﬃculties by adopting an
alternative specification known as ( ) discounting (or quasi-hyperbolic discounting). To distin-
guish it from our generalisations, we will refer to it as “order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting”.
This specification is a simple way of capturing the idea that the discount factor for (at least some)
adjacent periods may be increasing as trade-oﬀs become more distant in time. Last but not least,
these preferences are analytically convenient: they allow us to formulate intertemporal problems
recursively.
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting was first introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in the context of
inter-generational preferences. Later it was used by Laibson (1997) to study the savings behaviour
of a consumer with self-control problems who has access to imperfect commitment devices (e.g.
illiquid assets). Laibson’s key finding was that quasi-hyperbolic discounting will cause consumers
to undersave: each subsequent self will consume too much from the current self’s point of view. All
intertemporal selves can be made better oﬀ if each of them agreed to save more. Quasi-hyperbolic
preferences have also been applied to the problems of procrastination (O’Donoghue and Rabin,
1999), retirement decisions (Diamond and Koszegi, 2003), asset pricing (Kocherlakota, 2001), job
search (Paserman, 2008), growth (Barro, 1999) and addiction (Gruber and Koszegi, 2001).
2Recently Calcott and Petkov (2015) have managed to obtain an explicit solution for true hyperbolic agents with
a specific utility function. However, their analysis can be used in a narrow class of models. In contrast, our approach
can be applied outside the range of these settings. For more detail see Section 8.
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2.3.1 Definition
In essence ( ) preferences specify a lower discount factor only for the trade-oﬀ between the current
period and the one that follows immediately. For any other two consecutive future periods, the
discount factor is higher and invariant to the agent’s perspective. Formally, the discount function
is defined as
1(0) = 1 1() =  for  > 1. (3)
The parameter  is usually assumed to be in the interval (0 1].3 From the viewpoint of period ,
the decision maker’s lifetime utility is thus given by:
  =  + 
∞X
=1
+. (4)
The preferences are time invariant. When period +1 arrives, lifetime utility from the perspective
of that period will be:
 +1 = +1 + 
∞X
=1
++1
The above definition specifies a discount factor of  for the trade-oﬀ between today and
tomorrow. However, for any other two adjacent time periods,  + 1 and  ,  > 1, we have
1( +1)1() = . The implication is that order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting partially cap-
tures an important qualitative feature of true hyperbolic discounting: agents with such preferences
are more impatient about trade-oﬀs that are closer to their viewpoint. However, unlike true hyper-
bolic discounting, (3) does not give rise to a discount factor that is gradually increasing over the
entire planning horizon. From next period on, order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting eﬀectively
becomes exponential. This feature substantially simplifies the analysis of economic problems, but
3When  = 1, 1() reduces to the standard exponential discount function.
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also detracts from their realism. Indeed, few studies have found that ( ) preferences provides a
good fit to observed data.
2.3.2 Recursive representation of payoﬀs
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting is assumed primarily for analytical convenience, as it allows us to
formulate dynamic problems recursively. That is, we are able to represent an agent’s lifetime payoﬀ
as an expression of itself. The recursive formulation enables us to use dynamic programming in order
to characterise the time-consistent equilibrium in dynamic problems of agents with non-exponential
time preferences.
The recursive formulation for ( ) discounting was analysed in detail by Laibson (1997). We
now present a brief overview of his approach. The lifetime payoﬀ   of the decision maker’s period-
self is as defined by (4). Let  +1 be the continuation payoﬀ, i.e. the present value of all payoﬀs
he will receive after today. As noted earlier, the period- agent’s preferences eﬀectively become
exponential from period + 1 onward, implying that
 +1 = +1 +
∞X
=1
++1.
Consequently, we can express   as
  =  +  +1. (5)
Since  +1 is just the lifetime payoﬀ of an exponential discounter, it can be defined recursively as
in Subsection 2.1:
 +1 = +1 +  +2. (6)
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Moreover, it is possible to derive an equation that links   and  . By definition,
  =  +
∞X
=1
+. (7)
Multiplying (7) by  and subtracting it from (4) yields
  = (1− ) +  . (8)
3 Order-two quasi-hyperbolic discounting
This section describes a proposal for an alternative specification of time preferences which is also
amenable to recursive representation. We will refer to it as “order-two quasi-hyperbolic”. As before,
we will provide a recursive formulation of the lifetime payoﬀ on an agent with such preferences.
The complexity of the analysis increases only slightly relative to that in the previous section.
3.1 Definition of the discount function
Our first proposal generalises order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting by allowing the eﬀective dis-
count factor to increase over the first two consecutive trade-oﬀs. Formally, these preferences specify
an eﬀective discount factor of  for the first adjacent trade-oﬀ, and an eﬀective discount factor
of  for the second adjacent trade-oﬀ. For any other two consecutive future periods beyond that,
the eﬀective discount factor is assumed to be . If  ∈ (0 1) and  ∈ (0 1), the eﬀective discount
factor would be increasing for two consecutive trade-oﬀs (rather than just one as with order-one
discounting).
We construct the order-two quasi-hyperbolic discount function as follows. By assumption
2(0) = 1. Since the eﬀective discount factor for the trade-oﬀ between the current period and
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the next is , we must have 2(1) = 2(0) = . Similarly, the discount factor for the
trade-oﬀ between the next period and the one thereafter must be , implying that 2(2) =
2(1) = 22. Finally, for ∀ > 3, we have 2() = 2( − 1), so 2() = 2 . To recap,
our order-two specification is defined as
2(0) = 1 2(1) =  2() = 2 ∀ > 2 (9)
Note that order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting is a special case of this specification which occurs
when  = 1.
3.2 Recursive representation of payoﬀs
Now we formulate the lifetime payoﬀ of an agent with order-two quasi-hyperbolic preferences re-
cursively. This formulation will be used later when applying dynamic programming techniques to
study the intra-personal game of decision makers with such preferences.
The lifetime payoﬀ of the period- agent is defined as
  =  + +1 + 22+2 + 23+3 + 24+4 +  (10)
Let  +1 be the present value of the payoﬀs that are expected to accrue after today:
 +1 = +1 + +2 + 2+3 + 3+4 +  (11)
With this notation, (10) can be rewritten as:
  =  +  +1
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Moreover, note that  +1 would be the lifetime payoﬀ of an agent with order-one quasi-hyperbolic
preferences. In Section 2.3, we showed that it can be represented as
 +1 = +1 +  +2
where  +2 is the lifetime payoﬀ of a period-+ 2 agent with exponential preferences:
 +2 = +2 +  +3 (12)
To recap, the lifetime payoﬀ of a period- agent with order-two quasi-hyperbolic preferences can
be written as
  =  +  +1 (13)
where  +1 is defined as
 +1 = +1 +  +2 (14)
and  +2 satisfies
 +2 = +2 +  +3 (15)
4 Order-three quasi-hyperbolic discounting
Next we study an alternative generalisation of ( ) discounting. We will refer to it as “order-three
quasi-hyperbolic discounting”. This specification also gives rise to lifetime payoﬀs that are amenable
to recursive representation. Unlike the previous generalisation, however, it exhibits decreasing
impatience over the entire planning horizon. That is, 3( 0 + 1)3( 0)  3( 00 + 1)3( 00) for
all  0   00. We will show that this feature makes order-three quasi-hyperbolic discounting a very
good approximation to the true hyperbolic discount function. As with the previous generalisation,
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these preferences also nest order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting as a special case. Finally, the
added analytical complexity relative to order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting is relatively minor.
4.1 Recursive definition of the discount function
We consider the following recursive definition of the order-three quasi-hyperbolic discount function:
3( + 1) = +1 + 3() (16)
where 3(0) = 1, and    ∈ (0 1). Note that this specification constitutes a generalisation
of order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In particular, ( ) preferences are a special case of
(16) which arises when  = 0. Since the properties of this special case are well-known, we now
focus on settings where   0. We will show that these preferences may give rise to an increasing
eﬀective discount factor 3( + 1)3() for all  . This feature will allow us to attain a better
approximation to true hyperbolic discounting.
4.2 Closed-form representation
We can express (16) as a function of time only. In particular, it can be shown that (16) is equivalent
to
3() =
µ+1 − +1 +  (1− ) 
 − 
¶
  > 1. (17)
Below we present two alternative proofs.
4.2.1 Proof via induction
To prove the above result, we could use induction. First we verify that setting  = 1 and  = 2
in (17) would give us expressions identical to those generated by (16). Indeed, evaluating (17) at
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 = 1 and  = 2 yields
3(1) =
µ2 − 2 +  (1− ) 
 − 
¶
=  + 
3(2) =
µ3 − 3 +  (1− ) 2
 − 
¶
= 2 + ( + )
Then we assume that (17) holds for an arbitrary  . We will show that it will also hold for  + 1.
Substituting (17) in the right-hand side of (16) delivers
+1 + 
µ+1 − +1 +  (1− ) 
 − 
¶
 (18)
Simplifying (18) yields µ+2 − +2 +  (1− ) +1
 − 
¶
,
which is identical to (17) evaluated at  + 1. This completes our induction proof.
4.2.2 Proof by solving a homogeneous diﬀerence equation
Alternatively, we can obtain the discount function by solving a diﬀerence equation. Note that
3( + 2)− 3( + 1) = +2 = (3( + 1)− 3()).
Rearranging gives us
3( + 2)− ( + )3( + 1) + 3() = 0. (19)
Condition (19) is a homogeneous diﬀerence equation of order two with 3(1) = + and 3(2) =
2 + ( + ). This equation can be solved using standard techniques. Let 1 and 2 be the
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roots to the characteristic equation
2 − ( + )+  = 0.
That is,
1 =  2 = .
The solution to (19) is given by
3() = 1 + 2 , (20)
where the constants 1 2 are chosen to match 3(1) and 3(2):
1 + 2 =  + 
12 + 22 = 2 + ( + ).
Solving this system of equations for 1 and 2 yields
1 = 
( − )  2 =
(1− ) − 
( − ) .
Substituting 1 2 in (20) and rearranging delivers (17).
4.3 Gradually increasing discount factor
Expression (17) is helpful because we can use it to establish the range of parameter values for which
the eﬀective discount factor3(+1)3() will increasing for all  . As discussed earlier, the order-
one and order-two approximations lack this property. In particular, they specify constant discount
factors for trade-oﬀs beyond a given period: 1( +1)1() = ∀ > 1, and 2( +1)2() =
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∀ > 2.
We use (17) to obtain a closed-form expression for 3( + 1)3():
3( + 1)
3() =
+2 − +2 +  (1− ) +1
+1 − +1 +  (1− )  
Simplifying the above expression yields
3( + 1)
3() =
 − ( )+1 +  (1− ) ( )+1
 − ( )+1 +  (1−) ( )+1
=
( − )
 + [ (1− )− ]( )+1
+  (21)
From (21) we can infer that the agent’s eﬀective discount factor will be gradually increasing in
 if
(1− )   (22)
When  ∈ (0 1), this condition ensures that   . Thus, as  keeps increasing, the denominator
of the right-hand side of (21) will gradually become smaller, whilst the numerator ( − ) will
remain unchanged. To satisfy (22), the parameter  should be suﬃciently close to 0. Moreover,
this condition will never hold for any positive  if  = 1.
Note that, as  −→∞, the eﬀective discount factor between two adjacent periods (21) converges
to . Thus, order-three quasi-hyperbolic discounting implies a long-term (asymptotic) discount
factor of . This observation highlights an important diﬀerence between our specification and true
hyperbolic discounting: ( + 1)() converges to 1 instead.
We can rewrite (22) as  +   . The interpretation of this condition is that the eﬀective
discount factor will be gradually increasing as long as 3(1)3(0) is less than the long-term
discount factor.
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4.4 Recursive representation of payoﬀs
The recursive definition (16) of the order-three quasi-hyperbolic discount function can be used to
formulate the decision maker’s lifetime payoﬀ recursively. From the viewpoint of period , this
payoﬀ is given by
  =
∞X
=0
3()+  (23)
When period + 1 arrives, the lifetime payoﬀ from that perspective will be:
 +1 =
∞X
=0
3()++1 (24)
We would like to obtain an equation which describes the agent’s lifetime payoﬀ through itself.
Multiplying (24) by  and subtracting it from (23) yields
  −  +1 =  +
∞X
=1
[3()− 3( − 1)]+  (25)
However, the recursive definition (16) of the discount function suggests that 3()− 3( − 1) =
−1∀ . Hence, we can rewrite equation (25) as:
  −  +1 =  + 
∞X
=1
+  (26)
Note that the right-hand side of (26) is simply the period- lifetime payoﬀ of an agent with ( )
preferences. Let
  =  + 
∞X
=1
+ 
Using Laibson’s method described in section 2.3.2, we can formulate   recursively. Define the
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following sum:
 +1 =
∞X
=1
−1+ .
Thus, we can express   as
  =  +  +1.
As noted earlier, from the viewpoint of a period- agent with ( ) preferences, discounting becomes
exponential from + 1 onward. Hence,
 +1 = +1 +  +2
To recap, the lifetime payoﬀ   of an agent with order-three quasi-hyperbolic preferences can
be represented recursively as follows:
  =  +  +1 +  +1, (27)
where  +1 satisfies
 +1 = +1 +  +2. (28)
Note that if  = 0, the above recursive formulation reduces to that for ( ) preferences described
in Section 2.3.2. Finally, using (8), we could rewrite (26) in the following form:
  = (1− ) +  +1 +  .
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5 Comparison and calibration
Now we argue that 2() and, even more so, 3() can be calibrated to deliver a better approxima-
tion to true hyperbolic discounting relative to 1(). We constructed our order-two and order-three
approximations to nest ( ) preferences as a special case. Thus, for appropriately chosen values
of , both our generalisations are guaranteed to deliver a closer fit to the true hyperbolic discount
function. The question of interest is whether this improvement is significant for plausible parameter
values of (2).
To answer this question, we will use a numerical approach. Specifically, we calibrate the various
quasi-hyperbolic discount functions to match () for a range of values of the parameter .
Let 1(  ), 2(  ) and 3(  ) be the sums of squared diﬀerences between the relevant
discount function and the true hyperbolic discount function () over the first  periods:
(  ) =
X
=1
(()−())2  = 1 2 3,
We look for the values of the preference parameters    that minimise these expressions.
Our method is as follows. First we assign a particular value to the parameter  in (). Then
we compute the values ∗ ∗ ∗ which minimise (  ).4 As a measure of the goodness of fit we
could use the value of the minimised sum of squared diﬀerences ∗ = (∗ ∗ ∗). The parameter
 is set at  = 15. The calibrated preference parameters are reported in Table 1.
First, note that when  is low, our order-two approximation requires a value of  above 1
in order to best fit true hyperbolic discounting. If   1, however, the eﬀective discount factor
is not monotonically increasing in time. Since this contradicts the stylised fact about decreasing
impatience, we should either avoid this approximation in such cases, or use an alternative method
4The parameter  is absent from order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and so will not be reported.
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for calibration.
The table demonstrates that both 2() and 3() deliver a better fit to true hyperbolic dis-
counting relative to 1(). The improvement in precision when using our order-three specification
is bigger: the ratio ∗2∗1 is between .5443 and .3668, while the ratio ∗3∗1 is in the range .0168
to .0701. The intuition for this result is straightforward. As order-three quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing delivers a gradually increasing discount factor, this specification is able to approximate true
hyperbolic discounting more closely. Furthermore, note that the relative precision of the order-two
approximation improves for higher values of , while that of the order-three approximation is better
for lower values of .
The goodness of fit of our generalisations to true hyperbolic discounting can also be illustrated
graphically. Figure 1a and Figure 1b plot the calibrated values of the order-two and order-three
quasi-hyperbolic discount functions, as well as the corresponding values of the true hyperbolic
discount function, for  = 07. As Figure 1b demonstrates, the order-three approximation in
particular matches true hyperbolic discounting very closely.
To emphasise this point, Figure 2a and Figure 2b plot the eﬀective discount factors for the two
generalisations, 2(+1)2() and 3(+1)3(), next to the eﬀective discount factors (+
1)() of the true hyperbolic discount function with  = 07. As our order-three specification
yields a gradually increasing eﬀective discount factor, it manages to deliver a much better fit.
An alternative approach to calibration would be to minimise the weighted sum of squared diﬀer-
ences between the values of the true hyperbolic discount function and the relevant approximation.
It can be argued that periods that are closer to the agent’s perspective are more important for
him, so they should have higher weights. A natural candidate for a set of weights would be given
by the values of the true hyperbolic discount function. Thus, we could also choose the preference
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parameters to minimise the following objective functions:
˜(  ) =
X
=1
()(()−())2  = 1 2 3.
The values of    calibrated in this way are shown in Table 2.
6 General intra-personal game
The previous section demonstrated that our generalised discount functions are able to produce
values that are much closer to true hyperbolic discounting relative to Laibson’s approach. Next we
study the implications of this better fit for the predictions of economic models. In Section 7 we will
consider two popular economic applications of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In these special cases,
we can directly compute the Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) for true hyperbolic discounters.
We compare these equilibria to the predictions of the models with calibrated quasi-hyperbolic
discounting of order one, two and three. The comparison demonstrates that our order-two, and
especially order-three, approximations yield policies and strategies that are very close to those
generated by true hyperbolic discounting.
To do this comparison, we now analyse a general setting in which a stock variable evolves
according to a linear law of motion. The two economic applications we will explore in Section 7 are
special cases of this setting. Using the recursive representations of lifetime payoﬀs derived earlier, we
formulate Bellman equations for decision makers with order one, two and three quasi-hyperbolic
discount functions. Dynamic programming techniques enable us to derive Euler equations that
characterise their MPE strategies. We also provide an equilibrium condition for true hyperbolic
agents with a special class of utility functions.
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6.1 General setting
Suppose that the decision maker’s period- utility is given by ( ), where  is his current
consumption and  is a stock variable. The utility is strictly increasing in  and satisfies the
Inada conditions. It may or may not depend directly on . The stock evolves according to the
following law of motion:
+1 =  + . (29)
In the next section, we will analyse a couple of special cases of this general setting, where the
variables and the parameters will have specific economic interpretations.
As Strotz (1955-1956) demonstrated, unless decision makers have exponential preferences, they
will have a time consistency problem. There are several ways of modelling the behaviour of such
decision makers. In this paper, we assume that they are sophisticated. That is, they are aware
of their time consistency problem and take mitigating actions. We will model their choices as an
intra-personal dynamic game. Our focus will be on the MPE of this game. In other words, we
consider a consumption strategy that is a diﬀerentiable function of the current state:  = ().
Note that such an equilibrium is subgame perfect: a player’s strategy will be optimal for any value
of , and thus for any history.
6.2 Exponential discounting
First, we study the benchmark case of exponential discounting. Suppose that the agent’s discount
function is given by (1). As discussed earlier, these preferences would give rise to an optimal
consumption plan that is time consistent. To characterise it, we use dynamic programming. Let
the agent’s value function be  (). His Bellman equation is
 () = max {(
 ) +  ( + )}. (30)
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Diﬀerentiating the right-hand side of (30) with respect to  yields the first-order condition
 +  +1 = 0.
Thus,  +1 = −(). Furthermore, diﬀerentiating (30) with respect to  gives us an envelope
condition:
  =  +  +1 .
Substituting the expressions for   and  +1 in this envelope condition delivers the agent’s Euler
equation:
 + +1 − +1 = 0. (31)
Essentially condition (31) is a diﬀerence-diﬀerential equation. For some specifications of the utility
function , it can be used to obtain exact solutions for the optimal feedback rule (). In later
sections, we will compute such solutions.
6.3 Order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting
Now we assume that the consumer has order-one quasi-hyperbolic preferences. That is, his discount
function is defined by Laibson’s specification (3). These preferences would give rise to a time
consistency problem for the decision maker. To characterise his behaviour, we model consumption
choices as an intra-personal game between his current and the future selves. As explained earlier,
we focus on the Markov-perfect equilibrium of this game. Let the agent’s MPE strategy be  =
()∀.
We will use a method proposed by Laibson to derive a condition characterising this strategy.
The recursive formulation (5), (6) in Section 3 suggests that equilibrium consumption will solve
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the Bellman equation
 () = max {(
 ) +  ( + )}, (32)
where the continuation value function  satisfies
 () = (() ) +  ( + ()). (33)
Diﬀerentiating the right-hand side of (32) with respect to  yields the first-order condition
 −  +1 = 0.
Thus,  +1 = (). Moreover, diﬀerentiating (33) with respect to  gives us
  = +1 + +1 + (+ ) +1 .
We substitute  and +1 in the above condition to obtain the agent’s generalised Euler equation:
 + +1 − 
£+ (1− )+1 ¤+1 = 0. (34)
A comparison with (31) shows that now the equilibrium condition contains the extra term (1−
)+1 +1 . This term accounts for the strategic considerations in the intra-personal game between
the current consumer and his future self. Note that when  = 1 the intra-personal strategic eﬀect
disappears and (34) reduces to (31).
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6.4 Order-two quasi-hyperbolic discounting
Next we consider the first of our two generalisations. Suppose that the agent has order-two quasi-
hyperbolic preferences as defined by (9). Just as in the setting with order-one quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, the consumer will have a time consistency problem. Again, we focus on the Markov-
perfect equilibrium of his intra-personal game. Let the MPE strategy be  = (). To characterise
, we will apply dynamic programming techniques to the recursive formulation (13), (14), (15)
derived in Section 4. The agent’s Bellman equation is now given by:
() = max {(
 ) +  ( + )} (35)
where  is defined by
 () = (() ) +  ( + ()) (36)
In addition, (15) suggests that the third value function,  , satisfies the functional equation
 () = (() ) +  ( + ()) (37)
Taking the first-order condition of (35), we get:
 =  +1  (38)
Diﬀerentiating (36) and (37) with respect to  gives us
  =  +  + (+ ) +1 (39)
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and
  =  +  + (+ ) +1 , (40)
respectively. From (38), we obtain
 +1 = − 


Substituting   into (39) yields
 +1 = − 1(+ )
∙ −1
 + 
 + 
¸

Plugging   and  +1 into (40) delivers the following equation:
+
¡+1 +1 + +1 ¢+∙1− 1
¸
(++1 )
¡+2 +2 + +2 ¢−(++1 )+1 = 0
Simplifying this equation yields a necessary condition for the decision maker’s MPE strategy:
 + 
¡+1 +1 + +1 ¢− (+ +1 ) £+1 + (1− ) ¡+2 +2 + +2 ¢¤ = 0 (41)
In the special case when  = 1, this condition reduces to the order-one quasi-hyperbolic Euler
equation (34).
6.5 Order-three quasi-hyperbolic discounting
Similarly, consider a consumer whose discount function is order-three quasi-hyperbolic, i.e. defined
by (16). The recursive representation of the lifetime payoﬀ of an agent with such preferences was
given by (27), (28). Hence, his optimal consumption strategy would solve the following Bellman
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equation:
() = max {(
 ) + ( + ) +  ( + )} (42)
where  satisfies the functional equation
 () = (() ) +  ( + ()). (43)
We derive this agent’s generalised Euler equation using the same techniques as before. First,
diﬀerentiating the right-hand side of (42) yields the first-order condition
 +  +1 +  +1 = 0. (44)
Also, diﬀerentiating (42) with respect to  gives us an envelope condition,
  =  +  +1 +  +1 . (45)
Equations (44) and (45) together imply that
  =  − .
Substituting   in (44) delivers an expression for  +1 :
 +1 = −
 + (+1 − +1 )
 .
Finally, diﬀerentiating (43) with respect to  yields
  =  +  + (+ ) +1 .
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If we substitute   and  +1 in that condition, we obtain the generalised Euler equation
+ +1 −
£+ (1− )+1 ¤+1 −[+1 − +1 −(+ +1 )(+2 −+2 )] = 0 (46)
Note that if  = 0, (46) becomes identical to the Euler equation (34) for ( ) preferences.
6.6 True hyperbolic discounting with homogeneous payoﬀs
Although a general solution to the above intra-personal game with true hyperbolic discounting is
not available, Calcott and Petkov (2015) managed to characterise its Markov-perfect equilibrium
for a special class of payoﬀ functions. In particular, they focus on payoﬀs that are homogeneous of
some degree . That is, ( ) satisfies
( ) = ( ) ∀  0.
Such a specification yields an MPE strategy that is proportional to the state variable:  = .
If the law of motion of  is as given by (29), on the equilibrium path instantaneous payoﬀs will
exponentially converge to 0. In particular, if agents follow their equilibrium strategies, we will have
 = (1)(−1)(+ )(−1)( 1). This suggests that the agent’s lifetime payoﬀ may be finite.
As already argued, this problem cannot be formulated recursively. However, we could charac-
terise the MPE strategy using the one-shot deviation principle. Suppose that all agents from period
+1 onward will follow the equilibrium strategy  = , and consider the problem of of the decision
maker in period . He chooses  to maximise his lifetime payoﬀ   = P∞=0()(+  + ),
where + = + for  > 1. The homogeneity assumption implies that   can be rewritten as
  = ( ) + ( + )( 1)
∞X
=1
()(+ )(−1). (47)
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Note that   will be finite only if
(+ )  1.
Diﬀerentiating (47) with respect to  yields the first-order condition
( ) + ( + )−1( 1)
∞X
=1
()(+ )(−1) = 0. (48)
The MPE strategy must be time invariant. Hence, the optimal current consumption must be .
Also,  is homogeneous of degree  − 1. Thus, we can factor out ()−1.
( 1) + (+ )−1( 1)
∞X
=1
()(+ )(−1) = 0 (49)
Substituting () from (2) and rearranging yields
( 1) + 
(+ )( 1)
1

∞X
=1
(+ )
(1+ ) = 0.
Finally, we can rewrite the above condition as
( 1) + 
(+ )( 1)
1
 [Φ((+ )
 1 1)− ] = 0.
The function Φ is known as the Lerch transcendent:
Φ(  ) =
∞X
=0

( + ) . (50)
This function is well-defined for ||  1 and its values can be computed with standard mathematical
software such as Maple or Mathematica.5
5An alternative approach is to consider a finite horizon setting with true hypebolic consumer. Such a game can be
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To recap, the parameter  of the MPE strategy of a true hyperbolic consumer with instantaneous
utility that is homogeneous of degree  solves the necessary condition
( 1) + ( 1)
(+ ) () = 0 (51)
where
() = Φ((+ )
 1 1)
 − 1.
It should be pointed out that (51) may not have an interior solution for all admissible utility
functions. For example, in consumption - saving models, the agent may be best oﬀ postponing all
of his consumption indefinitely, i.e. choosing  = 0 in all periods.
7 Economic Applications
Now we apply the analysis of the general setting from the previous section to two specific economic
problems. These problems are well-known in the literature. They concern phenomena that would
be diﬃcult to explain within a neoclassical economic framework. In fact, they motivated much of
the existing research on hyperbolic discounting and its behavioural implications.
These two applications constitute special cases of the general setting studied above. The analy-
sis from Section 6 enables us to compute the equilibria for agents with true hyperbolic discounting,
and compare them to the predictions of the models based on the various quasi-hyperbolic approx-
imations. Our numerical examples demonstrate the order-three discounting, and to a lesser extent
order-two discounting, yield policies that are much closer to those of true hyperbolic discounters
as compared to Laibson’s approach.
solved numerically using backward induction. As the time horizon is extended, equilibrium strategy should converge
to that of the infinite-horizon game.
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7.1 Application one: consumption - saving model
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting was given particular prominence by Laibson (1998). In that paper,
( ) preferences were used to explain the low saving rate in the United States. Now we investigate
how our generalisations aﬀect the results of this model.
7.1.1 Setting
To illustrate the underlying mechanism, we will use a simple buﬀer stock model. Consider an agent
who has a capital stock . He chooses his current consumption , and attains an instantaneous
utility (). Initially we are agnostic about the functional form of . The only restriction is that it
does not depend on  directly:  ≡ 0. Later, when computing specific examples, we will assume
constant relative risk aversion utility: () = (1− − 1)(1− ). In the special case when  → 1,
this utility function converges to () = ln().
The agent saves the capital that is not used for consumption. Suppose that, in each period,
the gross interest rate is . Thus, the law of motion of  is given by (29), where  =  and
 = −. The agent’s objective is to maximise his lifetime utility subject to the above law of motion
of capital.
7.1.2 Consumption strategies
Next we characterise the decision maker’s equilibrium consumption strategies.
Exponential discounting First, suppose that the decision maker’s discount function is expo-
nential with factor . When  = ,  = − and  ≡ 0, Euler equation (31) takes the following
form:
 − +1 = 0.
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Consider the example with () = (1− − 1)(1 − ). We conjecture that the optimal feedback
rule is given by  = 0. Substitution in the Euler equation gives us a condition for 0:
1− 
1−
(1− 0) = 0.
In the limit case when () = ln(), we have
0 = (1− ).
Order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting Next, suppose that the consumer is an order-one
quasi-hyperbolic discounter. Assigning  = ,  = − and  ≡ 0 to Euler equation (34), we get
 − 
£
1− (1− )+1
¤+1 = 0.
In our example with () = (1−−1)(1−), we conjecture an MPE strategy with form  = 1.
Substitution in Euler equation (34) delivers the following condition for 1:
1− 
1−[1− 1(1− )]
(1− 1) = 0. (52)
In the limit case when () = ln(), solving for 1 yields
1 = 1− 
1− (1− ) .
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Order-two quasi-hyperbolic discounting Now consider an agent with order-two quasi-hyperbolic
preferences. His Euler equation will be given by
 − (+1 +1 ) − (1− +1 )
£+1 + (1− )+2 +2 ¤ = 0
Turning to our example with () = (1−−1)(1−), we again guess that equilibrium consumption
is proportional to the available capital:  = 2. Substituting this conjecture in (46) gives us an
equation for 2:
1− 2
1−
(1− 2) −
1−(1− 2)
(1− 2)
∙
1− (1− )
1−2
(1− 2)
¸
= 0 (53)
In the limit case when () = ln(), solving for 2 yields
2 = 1− 
1− [1−  − (1− )] .
As already discussed, order-one quasi-hyperbolic discounting is nested as a special case of our order-
two specification which arises when  = 1. Not surprisingly, if we set  = 1, condition (53) reduces
to (52).
Order-three quasi-hyperbolic discounting When the agent’s preferences are order-three
quasi-hyperbolic, his Euler equation takes the form
 −{ + [1− (1− )+1 ]}+1 + 2(1− +1 )+2 = 0
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If () = (1− − 1)(1− ) we guess a consumption strategy with form  = 3. The strategy
parameter 3 solves the equation
1− 
1−{ + [1− 3(1− )]}
(1− 3) +
2−2
(1− 3)2−1 = 0 (54)
In the limit case when () = ln(), we obtain
3 = (1− )(1− )
1− (1− ) .
When  = 0, (54) reduces to (52).
True hyperbolic discounting Finally, consider an agents who is a true hyperbolic discounter.
As mentioned earlier, a general solution to this problem is not available. However, we could use
the method of Calcott and Petkov (2015) to compute the MPE strategy when () is homogeneous
of some degree. In particular, suppose that () = 1−(1− ). This function is homogeneous of
degree 1− , implying a consumption strategy  = . Substitution in (51) gives us an equation
for :
 = Φ(((1− ))1− 1 1) , (55)
where Φ is the Lerch transcendent function as defined by (50).
Numerical comparison of strategies Now we compute numerical examples using the cali-
brated parameters of order-one, order-two and order-three quasi-hyperbolic preferences presented
in Table 1. Our objective is to verify whether the diﬀerent specifications will make diﬀerent predic-
tions about agent’s consumption strategies. We also compute the MPE strategy for decision makers
with true hyperbolic discounting using condition (55). All agents are assumed to have instantaneous
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utility () = 1−(1 − ). Let  = 105 and  = 03. Table 3 presents the consumption strat-
egy parameters  1 2 3 for various values of the parameter  of the true hyperbolic discount
function (2). The table shows a significant diﬀerence between the parameters of the equilibrium
strategies with order-one discounting on one hand, and order-two and order-three discounting on
the other. These diﬀerences are bigger for lower values of . Moreover, 2, and especially 3, are
much closer to  as compared to 1. Thus, our order-two and order-three approximations make
predictions that are much more in line with those of the model with true hyperbolic discounting.
7.2 Application two: smoking and internality taxes
It has been suggested that internalities due to present-biased preferences are an important reason
for government intervention in the market for cigarettes (Gruber and Kozsegi, 2001). Imperfect self-
control would cause smokers who cannot commit to future plans to over-consume (as assessed with
current preferences over future consumption). This over-consumption takes place because, from the
current viewpoint, the smoker’s subsequent selves will discount the harm from their addiction too
heavily. Taxing cigarettes would reduce smoking by decreasing the marginal utility of cigarettes,
but may also provide consumers with a commitment device to help them deal with their self-control
problem. In this subsection, we first characterise the smokers’ laissez-faire consumption strategies,
and then derive corrective taxes that would incentivise socially optimal consumption.
7.2.1 Setting
Consider a representative smoker with concave instantaneous utility  = ( ) − , where
 is the number of cigarettes smoked in period , and  is the price of a cigarette. The variable
 captures past smoking, and will be referred to as the consumer’s “addiction stock”. Its law of
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motion of is as follows:
+1 =  + .
The parameter  reflects the persistence of  over time. Smoking is enjoyable,   0, but it
contributes to subsequent addiction. Addiction increases the marginal utility of smoking:   0.
However, it is harmful to consumers:   0.
Assume that ( ) is homogeneous of degree 1. That is, ( ) = ( ) for any   0.
This property suggests an equilibrium strategy with form  = . Note that the derivatives  and
 are homogeneous of degree 0. Hence, on the equilibrium path marginal utilities will be constant:
( ) = ( 1) and ( ) = ( 1).
This application is a special case of the general intra-personal game studied in Section 6. We
can apply the analysis of that section by setting ( ) = ( )−  and  =   = 1.
7.2.2 Laissez-faire consumption strategies
First suppose that the market for cigarettes is free of government intervention. We now characterise
the equilibrium consumption strategies implied by the various time preference specifications.
Smokers with exponential preferences As a benchmark, suppose that the representative
smoker’s time preferences are exponential, i.e. his discount function is given by (1). As discussed
before, these preferences do not give rise to time consistency problems. In the absence of other
distortions, consumption will be socially eﬃcient. Setting  =   = 1 in Euler equation (31) yields
 + +1 − +1 = 0. (56)
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We conjecture that the equilibrium consumption strategy is  = 0. This conjecture, together
with the homogeneity assumption about , imply the following form for the above condition:
(0 1)−  = −(0 1)
1−  . (57)
From this equation we can compute the equilibrium 0.
Smokers with order-one quasi-hyperbolic preferences Next consider a smoker with ( )-
discounting. This specification was assumed by Gruber and Kozsegi (2001) in their work on inter-
nality taxes. In that setting, the agent’s Euler equation from Section 6 takes the form
 + +1 − 
£ + (1− )+1 ¤+1 = 0. (58)
As  is homogeneous of degree 1, we conjecture an equilibrium of the smoker’s intra-personal game
in which agents use strategies  = 1. Then the smoker’s generalised Euler equation (58) becomes:
(1 1)−  = − (1 1)
1−  [ + (1− )1] . (59)
We can use the above condition to compute 1.
Smokers with order-two quasi-hyperbolic preferences Now imagine that the smoker’s time
preferences are order-two quasi-hyperbolic. Given  =   = 1, addictive consumption will satisfy
the following version of Euler equation (41):
 + 
¡+1 +1 + +1 ¢− ( + +1 ) £+1 + (1− ) ¡+2 +2 + +2 ¢¤ = 0 (60)
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Note that when  = 1 this equation reduces to (59). Moreover, payoﬀ homogeneity of degree 1
presupposes an equilibrium strategy with form  = 2. Substitution in the above Euler equation
gives us the following condition:
(2 1)−  = − [1− ( + 2)(1− )](2 1)
1−  [ + 2(1− )]− ( + 2)(1− )2 . (61)
This condition allows us to compute 2.
Smokers with order-three quasi-hyperbolic preferences If the smoker’s discount function
is third-order quasi-hyperbolic, substituting  =   = 1 in Euler equation (46) would give us
 + +1 − 
£ + (1− )+1 ¤+1 − [+1 − +1 − ( + +1 )(+2 − +2 )] = 0. (62)
When  = 0, this equation is equivalent to (59). Moreover, if  is homogeneous of degree 1, the
MPE strategy will have a form  = 3. Hence, the above Euler equation will become
(3 1)−  = − { + [1 +  ( + 3)]}(3 1)
1−  [ + (1− )3]− [1 +  ( + 3)]  (63)
This equation can be solved for 3.
Smokers with true hyperbolic preferences Finally, suppose that smokers have true hyper-
bolic preferences. We can use Calcott and Petkov (2015) to characterise the MPE for the special
case when  is homogeneous of degree 1. As usual, the equilibrium strategy will be proportional to
the stock variable:  = . Substitution in (51) yields
( 1)− + ()[( 1)− ]
( + ) = 0
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where
() = Φ(( + ) 1 1) − 1.
Euler’s formula implies that
( 1)−  = [( 1)− ]+ ( 1).
Substituting this decomposition in the above necessary condition gives us
( 1)−  = − ()( 1) +  + () = 0.
7.2.3 Internality taxes
As already discussed, present-biased preferences will drive smokers to overconsume in the future
as assessed from their current viewpoint. This phenomenon is referred to as an “internality”. The
literature has argued that internalities account for a substantial part of cigarette taxes (Gruber
and Kozsegi, 2001). Next we derive the tax policies that induce eﬃcient consumption under the
various specifications of the smoker’s time preferences.
Additional assumptions Suppose that a benevolent social planner intervenes in the market for
cigarettes. He has a single instrument: a per-unit tax  levied on each cigarette smoked. All tax
revenues are returned to consumers as lump sum transfers. The planner’s objective is to maximise
lifetime social welfare.
To simplify the analysis, we will assume away all other distortions in the tobacco industry. In
particular, imagine that the market is perfectly competitive. That is, the price of cigarettes is equal
to the unit production cost:  = . Moreover, we assume that smoking does not give rise to any
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externalities, so the social cost of cigarettes is also . Thus, instantaneous period- welfare is
 = ( ) = ( )− .
The planner does not have any time consistency problem: he discounts future welfare exponentially
by a factor ˆ. Thus, lifetime welfare from the period- perspective is given by
Υ =
∞X
=0
(ˆ)+. (64)
As before, we will assume that  is homogeneous of degree 1. This assumption implies that the
marginal utilities   are constant on the eﬃcient path. Consequently, it will be possible to
implement eﬃciency with a tax rate that is constant over time.
Eﬃcient consumption rule The eﬃcient consumption plan maximises lifetime welfare (64). It
can be described in terms of a rule that assigns a level of consumption to any given value of the
state variable . If the above assumptions are satisfied, this consumption rule will have a form
 = ˆ. The parameter ˆ solves (56) where  =  and  = ˆ:
(ˆ 1)−  = − ˆ(ˆ 1)
1− ˆ . (65)
Tax for smokers with exponential preferences First suppose that the smoker has exponen-
tial preferences. As long as his discount factor is the same as the planner’s, he will follow the
eﬃcient consumption rule. The objectives of the smoker and the social planner will be identical,
so a corrective tax is not necessary: 0 = 0. This result is in line with the classic theory of ratio-
nal addiction, whose supporters claim that market eﬃciency eliminates the need to tax cigarette
consumption.
44
Tax for smokers with order-one quasi-hyperbolic preferences Now let the smoker have
( ) discounting. If   1, this smoker will suﬀer from present bias. Again, perfect competition
implies that  = . We would like to find the tax rate 1 which generates the eﬃcient consumption
rule ˆ as his private MPE strategy, i.e. as a solution to Euler equation (58). The tax reduces the
marginal utility of cigarettes: it is now given by (ˆ 1)− − 1. Replacing the left-hand side of
the smoker’s private Euler equation (59) with this after-tax marginal utility yields the following
condition:
(ˆ 1)− − 1 = (ˆ 1)
1− 
h
 + (1− )ˆ
i .
Reconciling this condition with (65) delivers an expression for the eﬃciency inducing tax rate
1 = −(ˆ 1)
1− ˆ +
(ˆ 1)
1− 
h
 + (1− )ˆ
i .
The right-hand side of this expression is the diﬀerence between two terms. The first term represents
the social valuation of the lifetime harm of smoking an extra cigarette. The second term captures
the private valuation of that lifetime harm.
Tax for smokers with order-two quasi-hyperbolic preferences Next consider a smoker
with order-two quasi-hyperbolic preferences. Suppose that the government levies a per-unit tax
2 which implements the eﬃcient consumption rule ˆ as the MPE strategy of the smoker’s intra-
personal game. Substituting the after-tax marginal utility of a cigarette in Euler equation (61)
suggests that 2 must satisfy
(ˆ 1)− − 2 = − [1− ( + ˆ)(1− )](ˆ 1)
1− 
h
 + ˆ(1− )
i
− ( + ˆ)(1− )ˆ

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Reconciling this with the eﬃciency condition (65) yields
2 = −(ˆ 1)
1− ˆ +
[1− ( + ˆ)(1− )](ˆ 1)
1− 
h
 + ˆ(1− )
i
− ( + ˆ)(1− )ˆ

As before, the eﬃciency inducing tax rate is equal to the diﬀerence between the social and the private
valuations of the marginal harm of smoking an extra cigarette. However, the private valuation is
now given by
− [1− ( + ˆ)(1− )](ˆ 1)
1− 
h
 + ˆ(1− )
i
− ( + ˆ)(1− )ˆ

This expression accounts for the modifications introduced to the smoker’s discount function. In the
special case when  = 1 we have 2 = 1
Tax for smokers with order-three quasi-hyperbolic preferences Imagine that a smoker
is an order-three quasi-hyperbolic discounter. Let the government’s per-unit tax now be 3. To
implement ˆ as the MPE strategy of the smoker’s intra-personal game, 3 must be such that ˆ
solves Euler equation (63) with marginal utility of cigarettes set to (ˆ 1)− − 3. That is, the
tax rate must satisfy
(ˆ 1)− − 3 = −
n
 + [1− ( + ˆ)]
o
(ˆ 1)
1− 
h
 + (1− )ˆ
i
− 
h
1− ( + ˆ)
i .
Reconciling this condition with (65) gives us
3 = − ˆ(ˆ 1)
1− ˆ +
n
 + [1− ( + ˆ)]
o
(ˆ 1)
1− 
h
 + (1− )ˆ
i
− 
h
1− ( + ˆ)
i 
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The diﬀerence with the tax rates derived previously is in the private valuation of the lifetime harm
of smoking an extra cigarette. Now this valuation has a form
−
n
 + [1− ( + ˆ)]
o
(ˆ 1)
1− 
h
 + (1− )ˆ
i
− 
h
1− ( + ˆ)
i .
Tax for smokers with order-three quasi-hyperbolic preferences Finally we study imple-
mentation of eﬃciency when smokers have true hyperbolic preferences. If the government imposes
a tax rate of , the private optimum will be consistent with eﬃciency if
(ˆ 1)− −  = − (ˆ)(ˆ 1)ˆ+  + ˆ(ˆ) ,
where (ˆ) is as defined earlier. Reconciliation with (65) suggests that the expression for the
eﬃciency inducing tax rate in this case would be given by
 = − ˆ(ˆ 1)
1− ˆ +
(ˆ)(ˆ 1)
ˆ+  + ˆ(ˆ) 
With true hyperbolic discounting, the private valuation of the lifetime harm from consuming an
extra cigarette is
(ˆ)(ˆ 1)
ˆ+  + ˆ(ˆ) .
Numerical examples To quantify the implications of the generalised quasi-hyperbolic prefer-
ences for addictive consumption and internality taxes, we now study a numerical example. Suppose
that the smoker’s instantaneous utility is
( ) = 1− − .
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Note that this utility satisfies the requirements of our model. The implied marginal utilities are
( 1) = −1 ( 1) = (1− ) − .
We can substitute these expressions in the Euler equations of Section 7.2.2 and Section 7.2.3. To
compute the numerical examples, we need to assign specific values to the parameters of the model.
Let  = 05, and let the social planner’s discount factor be ˆ = 09. Moreover, let  = 05  =
1  = 1. Table 4 reports the eﬃciency inducing tax rate for true hyperbolic consumers, as well as
the tax rates for the various quasi-hyperbolic approximations as calibrated in Section 5. The table
demonstrates that our order-two and order-three approximations yield tax rates that are close to
the optimal tax when discounting is true hyperbolic. Our policy predictions are much more accurate
relative to standard ( ) discounting.
8 Applications in which an exact solution is not available
In the two applications studied above, it was possible to obtain an exact solution for the equilib-
rium strategies of agents with true hyperbolic preferences. Thus, there was no need to actually
approximate true hyperbolic discounting with alternative specifications. The equilibria for settings
with quasi-hyperbolic discounting were computed to gauge the precision of the policy predictions
generated with these approximations.
However, in many instances exact solutions to problems of agents with true hyperbolic discount-
ing are simply not available. The assumptions used by Calcott and Petkov (2015) to derive such
solutions are quite restrictive. Specifically, instantaneous utilities must be homogeneous of degree
1. Any other specification would typically yield infinite lifetime payoﬀs. Moreover, instead of using
dynamic programming techniques, the analysis of Calcott and Petkov (2015) relied on the one-shot
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deviation principle. But sometimes it may be necessary to formulate a problem recursively in order
to solve it.
In this section, we will consider two models which are not solvable when preferences are true
hyperbolic. Since an exact solution cannot be obtained, we have to resort to approximations.
We argue that in such cases our approach is the best alternative. It usually yields finite lifetime
payoﬀs, and is amenable to recursive formulation. The analytical and computational tractability
of our method is reasonable and comparable to that of Laibson’s.
8.1 A model with Markovian uncertainty
First we study a problem with a stochastic component. In particular, we consider a version of our
second application in which the smoker’s instantaneous utility is random: it follows a Markovian
process. Because of this Markovian structure, we need to formulate the problem recursively in order
to solve it. While such a formulation is not possible for agents with true hyperbolic discounting, it
is quite feasible with our order-two and order-three quasi-hyperbolic approximations.
8.1.1 Setting
Consider a smoker with the following utility function:
 = 1− −  (66)
The parameter  is now a random variable that follows a Markovian chain. Suppose that  can
take two values:  and . If  = , then with probability  we will have +1 =  , and with
probability  (where  = 1− ) we will have +1 = . Similarly, if  = , then +1 =  with
probability , and +1 =  with probability  = 1− . Note that the state of the world is now
two-dimensional: it is described by  and . All other assumptions are the same as in the setting
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of Section 7.2. As before, we focus on a perfectly competitive industry, so in each period  = .
8.1.2 Exponential discounting
Suppose that a social planner can directly choose the smoker’s consumption. In period , instanta-
neous welfare is given by
 = ()()1− −  − ,
where  is as defined above. Again, for simplicity we will assume that the social planner is an
exponential discounter. Let his discount factor be ˆ. As  is now part of the state, the strategies
and the value functions will depend on the realisation of . Let Υ() be the planner’s value
function when  = , and let Υ() be his value function when  = . The planner’s Bellman
equations are
Υ() = max {(
)()1− −  −  + ˆ £Υ( + ) + Υ( + )¤} (67)
Υ() = max {(
)()1− −  −  + ˆ £Υ( + ) + Υ( + )¤}. (68)
Note that instantaneous welfare is homogeneous of degree 1. Thus, we conjecture optimal consump-
tion policies with forms  =  when  =  and  =  when  = . This, in turn, suggests
linear value functions: Υ() = Υ and Υ() = Υ. Evaluating the Bellman equations (67),
(68) on the optimal path gives us:
Υ = () −  −  + ( + )ˆ [Υ + Υ]  (69)
Υ = () −  −  + ( + )ˆ [Υ + Υ] . (70)
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Furthermore, diﬀerentiating (67), (68) with respect to  yields the following first-order conditions:
()−1()1− − + ˆ [Υ + Υ] = 0
()−1()1− − + ˆ [Υ + Υ] = 0.
If we evaluate these first-order conditions at  =  and  = , respectively, we obtain
()−1 − + ˆ [Υ + Υ] = 0 (71)
()−1 − + ˆ [Υ + Υ] = 0. (72)
Equations (71), (72), together with (69), (70), enable us to compute the parameters   of
the socially optimal consumption policies, as well as the coeﬃcients ΥΥ of the planner’s value
functions.
To illustrate the properties of the model, we compute a numerical example. Suppose that
 = 05 1 = 1 2 = 2  = 05  = 0 ˆ = 095. Table 5 shows the optimal consumption policies for
various values of the transition probabilities  .
8.1.3 Order-two discounting
Imagine that smoker has an order-two quasi-hyperbolic discount function. We can use equations
(13), (14), (15) from Section 3 to formulate his problem recursively. As already noted,  is now
an element of the state. Thus, we need to specify two current value functions. Let () be the
current lifetime payoﬀ when  = , and let () be the current lifetime payoﬀ when  = .
Similarly, let () be the consumer’s continuation payoﬀ when  = , and let () be his
continuation payoﬀ when  = . Finally, let () be the third value function when  = , and
let () be the third value function when  = . We will also assume that smoking incurs a per
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unit tax of  when  =  and a per-unit tax of  when  = . The smoker’s MPE strategies
are () and (), respectively.
In this setting, the consumer’s Bellman equations can be written as follows:
() = max {(
)()1− −  − (+ )
+ £( + ) + ( + )¤} (73)
() = max {(
)()1− −  − (+ )
+ £( + ) + ( + )¤}. (74)
The continuation payoﬀs () and () solve the functional equations
() = (())()1− −  − (+ )() (75)
+ £ (() + ) + (() + )¤ 
() = (())()1− −  − (+ )() (76)
+ £(() + ) + (() + )¤ 
where () and () satisfy
() = (())()1− −  − (+ )() (77)
+ £(() + ) + (() + )¤ 
() = (())()1− −  − (+ )() (78)
+ £(() + ) + (() + )¤ 
Given that payoﬀs are homogeneous of degree 1, the equilibrium will involve strategies  =
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 when  =  and  =  when  = . These strategies imply linear value functions:
() = , () = , () = , () = , () =, () =. Thus,
if we evaluate the Bellman equations on the equilibrium path, we will obtain
 = () −  − (+ ) + ( + ) [ + ]  (79)
 = () −  − (+ ) + ( + ) [ + ] . (80)
Moreover, conditions (75), (76) and (77), (78) simplify to
 = () −  − (+ ) + ( + ) [ + ]  (81)
 = () −  − (+ ) + ( + ) [ + ] (82)
and
 = () −  − (+ ) + ( + ) [ + ]  (83)
 = () −  − (+ ) + ( + ) [ + ]  (84)
respectively. Finally, diﬀerentiating the two Bellman equations yields the following first-order
conditions:
()−1()1− − (+ ) +  [ + ] = 0,
()−1()1− − (+ ) +  [ + ] = 0.
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Evaluating these first-order conditions at at  =  and  = , respectively, we get
()−1 − (+ ) +  [ + ] = 0, (85)
()−1 − (+ ) +  [ + ] = 0 (86)
For given tax rates  , conditions (79), (80), (81), (82), (83), (84), (85), (86) allow us to
compute the strategy parameters  , as well as the coeﬃcients     of the value
functions.
Now imagine that the social planner sets the tax rates to implement his preferred consumption
policies   characterised in Section 8.1.2 as MPE strategies in the smoker’s intra-personal game.
Then equations (79), (80), (81), (82), (83), (84), (85) (86) can be used to compute the eﬃciency
inducing taxes  , as well as the coeﬃcients     of the value functions. For
illustration we compute a numerical example with the same parameter values as in Section 8.1.2.
We use the values of    from our calibration exercise with  = 07:  = 89261  = 98796  =
66703. Table 6 shows the laissez-faire consumption strategies  , as well as the optimal tax
rates  .
8.1.4 Order-three discounting
Now consider a smoker with order-three quasi-hyperbolic preferences. Let () be the current
value function when  = , and let () be the current value function when  = . Similarly,
let () and () be the continuation value functions when  =  and  = , respectively.
As before, smoking incurs a per unit tax of  when  =  and a per-unit tax of  when  = .
The smoker’s MPE strategies are () and ().
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The recursive formulation (27), (28) from Section 4 implies the following Bellman equations:
() = max {(
)()1− −  − (+ ) + 
£( + ) + ( + )¤
+ £( + ) + ( + )¤} (87)
() = max {(
)()1− −  − (+ ) + 
£( + ) + ( + )¤
+ £( + ) + ( + )¤} (88)
The continuation value functions must satisfy
() = ¡()¢ ¡¢1− −  − (+ )() (89)
+ £ ¡() + ¢+  ¡() + ¢¤ 
() = ¡()¢ ¡¢1− −  − (+ )() (90)
+ £ ¡() + ¢+  ¡() + ¢¤ 
Again, when  =  the smoker’s MPE strategy is  = , and when  =  his MPE strategy
is  = . Consequently, the value functions will be linear: () =  () =  and
() =() =. Evaluating the Bellman equations (87) and (88) on the equilibrium
path gives us:
 = () − (+ ) −  +  ( + ) [ + ] +  ( + ) [ + ]  (91)
 = () − (+ ) −  +  ( + ) [ + ] +  ( + ) [ + ]  (92)
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Moreover, conditions (89) and (90) simplify to
 = () − (+ ) −  +  ( + ) ( + )  (93)
 = () − (+ ) −  +  ( + ) ( + )  (94)
Finally, diﬀerentiating the Bellman equations (87) and (88) yields the following first-order condi-
tions:
()−1()1− − (+ ) +  [ + ] +  [ + ] = 0
()−1()1− − (+ ) +  [ + ] +  [ + ] = 0
Evaluating these first-order conditions at  =  and  = , respectively, gives us
()−1 − (+ ) +  [ + ] +  [ + ] = 0 (95)
()−1 − (+ ) +  [ + ] +  [ + ] = 0 (96)
Equations (91), (92), (93), (94), (95), (96) can be solved numerically to deliver the MPE strategy
parameters  , and the coeﬃcients   of the value functions.
Again, we could compute the tax rates that implement the optimal consumption policies  
in the example of Section 8.1.2. To do that, we solve (91), (92), (93), (94), (95), (96) for  ,
as well as for the coeﬃcients  . Assume the same parameters as in Section 8.1.2. The
values of    are those that deliver the best fit for true hyperbolic discounting with  = 07:
 = 92671  = 13683  = 48324. Table 7 presents the laissez-faire strategies,  , and the
optimal tax rates,  .
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8.2 Linear-quadratic utility
We now consider an alternative specification of the decision maker’s instantaneous utility. In
particular, suppose that a smoker has the following utility function:
( ) = − 
2
2 +  −  − 
2
2, (97)
where   0   0   0   0   0. The corresponding marginal utilities are
( ) =  −  +  (98)
( ) =  −  − . (99)
As before, the addiction stock evolves according to
+1 =  + 
This payoﬀ specification satisfies the standard assumptions imposed in models of rational addiction.
That is, i) smoking brings instantaneous satisfaction but reduces future utility, and ii) smoking
today increases the marginal utility of smoking tomorrow. In fact, this particular functional form
was assumed in Becker and Murphy (1988).
Linear-quadratic payoﬀs usually imply MPE strategies with form
() =  + . (100)
Thus, per-period payoﬀs will usually have a non-zero value in the steady state. This suggests that
the optimal consumption plan of a true hyperbolic discounter with such utility will not be interior.
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The reason is that his lifetime payoﬀ will be infinite. However, if we want to compute an interior
consumption plan in a setting with similar qualitative properties, we could use our order-two and
order-three approximations. They would deliver finite lifetime payoﬀs so long as   1.
8.2.1 Order-two discounting
Consider a setting in which a consumer has an order-two quasi-hyperbolic discount function. As
established earlier, his MPE strategy will satisfy (60), where  and  are now given by (98)
and (99), respectively. Furthermore, we conjecture that the MPE strategy is () = 2 + 2.
Therefore,  = 2. Consequently, (41) will take the following form:
0 =  −  +  + [2( − +1 + +1) + +1 −  − +1]− (101)
( + 2){ − +1 + +1 + (1− )[2( − +2 + +2) + +2 −  − +2].
Moreover, in equilibrium we must have
+1 =  +  (102)
+1 = 2+1 + 2 (103)
+2 = (2 + )+1 + 2 (104)
+2 = 2+2 + 2 (105)
We can substitute (102), (103), (104), (105) in (101) and apply the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients to obtain equations for the MPE strategy parameters 2 2.
For example, suppose that  = 1,  = 2,  = 1,  = 1,  = 2. Let  = 05. Moreover,
we assign    their calibrated values obtained in Section 5 for  = 07. That is,  = 89261  =
98796  = 66703. Given these parameters, we compute the following MPE strategy: 2 = 087534,
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2 = 018435. The steady state addiction stock ¯2 solves ¯2 = (2+)¯2+2. Thus, ¯2 = 044694.
Consequently, steady state addictive consumption would be ¯2 = 2¯2 + 2 = 022347.
8.2.2 Order-three discounting
Now suppose that the consumer is a third-order quasi-hyperbolic discounter. Thus, his equilibrium
strategy will satisfy (62). The marginal utilities  and  are again given by (98) and (99).
As in the previous subsection, we conjecture a linear MPE strategy: () = 3 + 3. Hence,
 = 3. Substituting the derivatives of the utility and the strategy conjecture in the decision
maker’s generalised Euler equation yields
0 = ( −  + ) + (+1 −  − +1)−  [ + (1− )3] ( − +1 + +1)
−{( − +1 + +1)− (+1 −  − +1)
+( + 3){( − +2 + +2)− (+2 −  − +2)},
where
+1 =  +  (106)
+1 = 3+1 + 3 (107)
+2 = (3 + )+1 + 3 (108)
+2 = 3+2 + 3 (109)
Applying the method of the undetermined coeﬃcients to the above condition gives us equations for
the strategy parameters 3 3.
Again, consider the numerical example with utility parameters  = 1,  = 2,  = 1,
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 = 1,  = 2 and  = 05. The time preference parameters are calibrated to fit true hyperbolic
discounting with  = 07:  = 92671  = 13683  = 48324. Solving for the MPE strategy
parameters gives us 3 = 075450, 3 = 008981. The corresponding steady state addiction stock
is ¯3 = 021154. It implies steady state consumption ¯3 = 010577.
9 Further generalisations
Our order-two and order-three quasi-hyperbolic specifications can be generalised further. This
would enable us to attain an even better approximation to true hyperbolic discounting. However,
the cost of achieving a better fit would be increased analytical and computational complexity.
To generate these discount functions, we use methods similar to those in Sections 3 and 4.
In particular, suppose that a discount function () yields lifetime payoﬀs that are amenable to
recursive formulation. Consider the following two transformations:
2() = ( − 1) (110)
and
3() = () + 3( − 1), (111)
where 2(0) = 1 and 3(0) = 1. The resulting discount functions 2() and 3() will also
give rise to lifetime payoﬀs that can be formulated recursively. Moreover, they will nest () as a
special case which arises when  = 1 and  = 0, respectively.
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9.1 Generalising order-two discounting
9.1.1 Definition
Order-two quasi-hyperbolic discounting generalised Laibson’s specifications by allowing an increas-
ing eﬀective discount factor for the first two adjacent trade-oﬀs. We could extend this approach
to three of these trade-oﬀs by applying (110) to 2(). Specifically, consider a discount function
22() constructed as follows:
22(0) = 1 22() = 2( − 1)  > 1.
That is, 22(0) = 1, 22(1) = , 22(2) = , and 22() = 2−1 for  > 3. The implied
eﬀective discount factors are i)  for the first adjacent trade-oﬀ, ii)  for the second adjacent
trade-oﬀ, and  for the third adjacent trade-oﬀ. For any other two consecutive future periods
beyond  = 4, the eﬀective discount factor is always . If   1   1 and   , impatience
will be decreasing in the first three periods. Moreover, note that if  = 1, these preferences become
identical to order-two quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
9.1.2 Recursive formulation
Using a method similar to that in Section 3, we can provide a recursive formulation for the lifetime
payoﬀ of a decision maker with such preferences. Let this lifetime payoﬀ be denoted by Ψ:
Ψ =  + +1 + +2 + 22+3 + 23+4 + 24+5 (112)
It can be rewritten as
Ψ =  + (+1 + +2 + 22+3 + 23+4 + 24+5)
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Define  +1 to be:
 +1 = +1 + +2 + 22+3 + 23+4 +  (113)
It follows that
Ψ =  +  +1.
But  +1 is in fact the lifetime payoﬀ of a decision maker with order-two quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing. From Section 3 we know that  +1 can be defined recursively as follows:
 +1 =  +2
 +2 =  +3
 +3 =  +4.
9.1.3 Generalised Euler equation
Now consider the general intra-personal game as set up in Section 6. Using the above recursive
formulation, we can derive an Euler equation for a decision maker with these preferences. His MPE
strategy must solve the following Bellman equation:
Ψ() = max {(
 ) + ( + )} (114)
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where
() = (() ) +  ( + ()) (115)
 () = (() ) +  ( + ()) (116)
 () = (() ) +  ( + ()) (117)
Diﬀerentiating (114) yields the first-order condition
 + +1  +1 = 0.
Solving this first-order condition for  +1 gives us  +1 = −(). Next, diﬀerentiate (115) to
get
  = ( + ) + (+ ) +1 .
Substituting   above and solving for  +1 , we obtain
 +1 = − 
−1
(+ )
− (
 + )
(+ )
.
Now diﬀerentiate (116):
  = ( + ) + (+ ) +1 = 0
Substitute   in the above equation and solve for  +1 :
 +1 = − 1(+ )
"
−2
(+ −1 )
+
(−1 −1 + −1 )
(+ −1 )
+ ( + )
#
.
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Finally, diﬀerentiating (117) delivers
  = ( + ) + (+ ) +1 = 0.
Substituting   +1 in that condition gives us the decision maker’s generalised Euler equation:
−2 + (−1 −1 + −1 )
−(+ −1 )
∙ −1
 −
µ
1− 1
¶
( + ) + (1− )(+ )(+1 +1 + +1 )
¸
= 0.
This equation can be used the compute the equilibrium strategies in our economic applications.
Compared to (41), it has an extra term reflecting more complicated intra-personal strategic eﬀects.
This extra term increases the computational complexity when solving for the MPE strategy. Also,
note that when  = 1, this Euler equation eﬀectively reduces to (41).
9.2 Combining the order-one and order-three specifications
9.2.1 Definition
It is also possible to apply (110) to3(), thus eﬀectively combining Laibson’s approach with order-
three quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In particular, we could construct another discount function 31
as follows:
31(0) = 1 31(1) =  31() = 3( − 1) = 
µ −  +  (1− ) −1
 − 
¶
  > 2
With this specification, the short-run discount factor for the trade-oﬀ between today and tomorrow
is . Then, from next period onward, the discount factor becomes 3( + 1)3(). Impatience
will be decreasing in all periods if    +   .
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9.2.2 Recursive formulation
Again, the lifetime payoﬀ of a decision maker with such preferences is amenable to recursive for-
mulation. We denote this lifetime payoﬀ by Ψ. By construction,
Ψ =  + [3(0)+1 +3(1)+2 +3(2)+3 + ].
Let  +1 = 3(0)+1 +3(1)+2 +3(2)+3 +  Therefore,
Ψ =  +  +1.
Note that  +1 is the lifetime payoﬀ of a period- + 1 decision maker with order-three quasi-
hyperbolic preferences. In Section 4 we showed how to formulate  +1 recursively. Specifically,
 +1 = +1 +  +2 +  +2, (118)
where  +2 satisfies
 +2 = +2 +  +3. (119)
9.2.3 Generalised Euler equation
Using this formulation, we can derive a generalised Euler equation for the MPE of the intra-personal
game set up in Section 6. The equilibrium strategy solves the Bellman equation
Ψ() = max {(
 ) + ( + )} (120)
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where () satisfies
() = (() ) + ( + ()) +  ( + ()) (121)
 () = (() ) +  ( + ()). (122)
Diﬀerentiating (120) yields the first-order condition
 +  +1 = 0.
Solving this condition for  +1 delivers  +1 = −(). Next, diﬀerentiate (121) with respect to
:
  =  +  + (+ )( +1 +  +1 ).
Substitute  , +1 in the above equation and solve for  +1 :
 +1 = − 
−1
(+ )
− 
 + 
(+ )
+

 .
Finally, diﬀerentiate (122) with respect to  to get
  =  +  + (+ ) +1 .
Substitution of   +1 delivers the agent’s generalised Euler equation
−1 + ( + )
−(+ )
∙
 − 
µ
1− 1
¶¡+1 +1 + +1 ¢+  − (+ +1 )+1 ¸ = 0.
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Given this equation, we can compute the agent’s equilibrium strategies in the economic applications
studied in Section 7.
9.3 Generalising order-three discounting
9.3.1 Definition
Our order-three quasi-hyperbolic specification defined the discount function through a second-order
homogeneous diﬀerence equation. We could generalise this approach further by applying transfor-
mation (111) to 3(). The resulting discount function will satisfy a higher order homogeneous
diﬀerence equation. In particular, consider a discount function 33() constructed as follows:
33(0) = 1 33( + 1) = 3( + 1) + 33()  > 1.
Thus, 33(0) = 1, 33(1) =  +  + , 33(2) = 2 + ( + ) + ( +  + ), 33(3) =³4−4+(1−)3
−
´
+(2++2)+2(++), etc. Note that when  = 0, this specification
reduces to our order-three approximation.
To express 33() as a function of  only, remember that 3() satisfies
3( + 1)− 3() = [3()− 3( − 1)]. (123)
Furthermore, the definition of 33() suggests that
3( + 1) = 33( + 1)− 33(). (124)
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Substitution into (123) delivers
[33(+1)−33()]−[33()−33(−1)] = {[33()−33(−1)]−[33(−1)−33(−2)]},
which can be rearranged as
33( + 1)− (+  + )33() + (+ + )33( − 1)− 33( − 2) = 0. (125)
Condition (125) is a homogeneous diﬀerence equation of order three. Its characteristic equation,
3 − (+  + )2 + (+ + )−  = 0,
has roots 1 = , 2 = , 3 = . Therefore, the solution to the above diﬀerence equation is given
by
33() = 1 + 2 + 3 . (126)
The constants 1 2 3 are chosen to match 33(1), 33(2) and 33(3):
1 + 2 + 3 =  +  + 
12 + 22 + 32 = 2 +  + 2 + ( +  + ).
13 + 23 + 33 =
µ4 − 4 +  (1− ) 3
 − 
¶
+ (2 +  + 2) + 2( +  + ).
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Solving for 1 2 3 gives us
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
2
3
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
  
2 2 2
3 3 3
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
−1 ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
 +  + 
2 +  + 2 + ( +  + )³4−4+(1−)3
−
´
+ (2 +  + 2) + 2( +  + )
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
9.3.2 Recursive formulation
Next we provide a recursive representation of the decision maker’s lifetime payoﬀ in period . Let
it be denoted by Ψ:
Ψ = 33(0) +33(1)+1 +33(2)+2 +  (127)
Similarly, in period + 1 we have that
Ψ+1 = 33(0)+1 +33(1)+2 +33(2)+2 +  (128)
Multiply (128) by  and subtract it from (127):
Ψ − Ψ+1 =  + [33(1)− 33(0)]+1 + [33(2)− 33(1)]+2 + [33(3)− 33(2)]+3 + 
By construction, this expression is equivalent to
Ψ = Ψ+1 +  +3(1)+1 +3(2)+3 + 
Let   =  +3(1)+1 +3(2)+3 + . Therefore,
Ψ =   + Ψ+1.
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Note that   is the lifetime payoﬀ of a decision maker with order-three quasi-hyperbolic preferences.
In Section 4, we showed how to formulate   recursively. It can be represented as
  =  +  +1 +  +1
 +1 = +1 +  +2.
9.3.3 Generalised Euler equation
Now consider the general game of Section 6. We will derive an Euler equation for a decision maker
with these preferences. The above recursive formulation of his lifetime payoﬀ suggests that his
MPE strategy solves the following Bellman equation:
Ψ() = max {(
 ) + ( + ) +  ( + ) + Ψ( + )} (129)
where
() = (() ) + ( + ()) +  ( + ()) (130)
 () = (() ) +  ( + ()). (131)
The first-order and the envelope conditions associated with (129) are
 + [ +1 +  +1 + Ψ+1 ] = 0
Ψ =  + [ +1 +  +1 + Ψ+1 ].
From these equations we obtain
Ψ =  − ,
70
which implies that
 +1 +  +1 = −− (+1 − +1 ).
Diﬀerentiating (130) gives us
  =  +  + (+ )( +1 +  +1 ).
Substitute  +1 +  +1 in this condition to obtain
  =  − − (+ )(+1 − +1 )
Now plug   and Ψ in the first-order condition and solve for  +1 :
 +1 = −
 + (+ )(+1 − +1 )− (+ +1 )(+2 − +2 )

Finally, diﬀerentiating (131) yields
  =  +  + (+ ) +1 .
Substituting   +1 delivers the decision maker’s generalised Euler equation:
 + +1 − [+ (1− )]+1 − (+ )[+1 − +1 ]
−(+ +1 ){[(+ ) + ](+2 − +2 )− (+ +2 )(+3 − +3 )} = 0.
This condition can be used to compute the MPE strategies in our economic applications.
71
9.4 Combining the order-two and order-three specifications
9.4.1 Definition
We can also construct a combination of our order-two and order-three specifications by applying
transformation (111) to 2(). This combined approach would nest both our order-two and order-
three approximations as special cases. Thus, a calibration of this specification will necessarily
deliver a better fit to true hyperbolic discounting than both 2() and 3().
Specifically, define the discount function 32() as follows
32(0) = 1, 32( + 1) = 2( + 1) + 32()∀ > 2,
where 2() is our order-two generalisation as defined in Section 3. This definition yields 32(0) =
1, 32(1) =  + , 32(2) = 22 + ( + ), 32(3) = 23 + (22 + ( + )). Note
that if  = 0, 32() is reduced to our order-two approximation. If, on the other hand  = 1,
2() is just the order-one quasi-hyperbolic discount function, so 32() becomes equivalent to the
order-three approximation.
This discount function is defined by the same third-order diﬀerence equation as 33(). How-
ever, the initial conditions diﬀer from those in the previous subsection. Therefore,
32() = ˜1 + ˜2 + ˜3 . (132)
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where the constants ˜1 ˜2 ˜3 now satisfy
˜1 + ˜2 + ˜3 =  +  (133)
˜12 + ˜22 + ˜32 = 22 + ( + ), (134)
˜13 + ˜23 + ˜33 = 23 + (22 + ( + )). (135)
Solving (133), (134), (135) gives us
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
2
3
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
  
2 2 2
3 3 3
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
−1 ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
 + 
22 + ( + )
23 + (22 + ( + ))
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
9.4.2 Recursive formulation
To provide a recursive formulation of the decision maker’s lifetime payoﬀ, we follow the same
method as in the previous subsection. Let this lifetime payoﬀ from the period- perspective be Ψ:
Ψ = 32(0) +32(1)+1 +32(2)+2 +  (136)
In the subsequent period, we will have
Ψ+1 = 32(0)+1 +32(1)+2 +32(2)+2 +  (137)
Multiply (136) by  and subtract from (137) to get
Ψ − Ψ+1 =  + [32(1)− 32(0)]+1 + [32(2)− 32(1)]+2 + [32(3)− 32(2)]+3 + 
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By construction, the above equation is identical to
Ψ − Ψ+1 =  +2(1)+1 +2(2)+2 +2(3)+3 +  (138)
But the right-hand side of (138) is the lifetime payoﬀ of a decision maker with order-two quasi-
hyperbolic preferences. Its recursive representation was derived in Section 3. In particular, let
  =  +2(1)+1 +2(2)+2 +2(3)+3 +  Then we have that
Ψ =   + Ψ+1
where
  =  +  +1 (139)
 +1 = +1 +  +2 (140)
 +2 = +2 +  +3 (141)
9.4.3 Generalised Euler equation
Consider the general game of Section 6. The MPE strategy of the decision maker will solve the
following Bellman equation:
Ψ() = max {(
 ) +  ( + ) + Ψ( + )} (142)
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The value functions Ω must satisfy the same functional equations as (36), (37):
 () = (() ) +  ( + ()) (143)
 () = (() ) +  ( + ()) (144)
Now let us derive the corresponding Euler equation. Diﬀerentiating (142) yields a first-order con-
dition and an envelope condition:
 + [ +1 + Ψ+1 ] = 0
Ψ =  + [ +1 + Ψ+1 ],
respectively. These conditions imply that
Ψ =  − ,
Substituting Ψ in the first-order condition gives us
 +1 = −
 + (+1 − +1 )
 .
Next diﬀerentiate (143) to obtain
  = ( + ) + (+ ) +1 = 0.
Substitute   and solve for  +1 :
 +1 = − 122(+ )
£−1 + ( − ) + ( + )¤ .
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Finally, diﬀerentiate (144):
  = ( + ) + (+ ) +1 = 0
Substituting   +1 in the above condition yields the decision maker’s generalised Euler equa-
tion:
−1 + ( − ) + ( + ) + 22(+ )( + )
−(+ )
£ + (+1 − +1 ) + (+1 +1 + +1 )¤ = 0
Again, we can use this Euler equation to compute the MPE strategy in the economic applications.
10 Conclusion
This paper studies generalisations of quasi-hyperbolic discounting which yield lifetime payoﬀs that
are amenable to recursive representation. Our proposals nest Laibson’s ( )-preferences as a spe-
cial case. Consequently, they always provide better approximations to true hyperbolic discounting.
We illustrate this point by undertaking a calibration exercise. It clearly shows that our order-two
and order-three specifications deliver a superior goodness of fit as compared to standard quasi-
hyperbolic discounting.
We also investigate how these approximations aﬀect the predictions of two popular economic
models: i) Laibson’s consumption-saving model, and ii) smoking and internality taxes. Specifically,
we analyse a general intra-personal game which includes these models as special cases. The analysis
is then used to compute the equilibrium for true hyperbolic discounters, and compare it to those for
agents with order-two and order-three quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Again, our numerical examples
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demonstrate that order-three (and, to a lesser extent, order-two) discounting yield policies that are
close to those with true hyperbolic discounting.
In the aforementioned applications, we can characterise the behaviour of true hyperbolic agents
without resorting to approximations of their time preferences. However, there are settings where
exact solutions to these problems are not available. We consider two such settings, featuring i)
Markovian uncertainty, and ii) linear-quadratic utility. We argue that in these cases our proposals
are quite compelling: they yield finite lifetime payoﬀs, and can be analysed with standard dynamic
programming techniques.
Finally, we show that our order-two and order-three quasi-hyperbolic specifications can be
generalised further. These higher-order generalisations would allow us to obtain even closer ap-
proximations to true hyperbolic discounting. We provide expressions for their discount functions,
and derive equilibrium conditions for the general intra-personal game.
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()  = 3  = 5  = 7  = 8  = 9
O1 QH
∗ = 72017
∗ = 90934
∗1 = 04115
∗ = 62576
∗ = 88378
∗1 = 04019
∗ = 56111
∗ = 86393
∗1 = 03468
∗ = 53521
∗ = 85536
∗1 = 03182
∗ = 51228
∗ = 84749
∗1 = 02912
O2 QH
∗ = 77045
∗ = 108596
∗ = 91938
∗2 = 002075
∗ = 70620
∗ = 104537
∗ = 90306
∗2 = 001741
∗ = 66703
∗ = 98796
∗ = 89261
∗2 = 001362
∗ = 65258
∗ = 95801
∗ = 88863
∗2 = 001204
∗ = 64043
∗ = 92838
∗ = 88521
∗2 = 001068
O3 QH
∗ = 66772
∗ = 12108
∗ = 94872
∗3 = 00069
∗ = 56296
∗ = 13205
∗ = 93610
∗3 = 00140
∗ = 48324
∗ = 13683
∗ = 92671
∗3 = 00184
∗ = 45006
∗ = 13787
∗ = 92274
∗3 = 00196
∗ = 42047
∗ = 13826
∗ = 91914
∗3 = 00204
Table 1: Parameter Calibration
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()  = 3  = 5  = 7  = 8  = 9
O1 QH
∗ = 78888
∗ = 89306
˜∗1 = 01278
∗ = 72132
∗ = 85205
˜∗1 = 00887
∗ = 66865
∗ = 81914
˜∗1 = 00588
∗ = 64519
∗ = 80527
˜∗1 = 00483
∗ = 62317
∗ = 79287
˜∗1 = 00400
O2 QH
∗ = 82264
∗ = 102895
∗ = 90876
˜∗2 = 00586
∗ = 77775
∗ = 96875
∗ = 88482
˜∗2 = 00345
∗ = 749837
∗ = 90337
∗ = 86840
˜∗2 = 00207
∗ = 73927
∗ = 87183
∗ = 86197
˜∗2 = 00164
∗ = 73023
∗ = 841608
∗ = 85640
˜∗2 = 00132
O3 QH
∗ = 64775
∗ = 13787
∗ = 94446
˜∗3 = 00022
∗ = 52910
∗ = 15985
∗ = 92757
˜∗3 = 00033
∗ = 44093
∗ = 17202
∗ = 91389
˜∗3 = 00034
∗ = 40531
∗ = 175568
∗ = 90787
˜∗3 = 00032
∗ = 37420
∗ = 17783
∗ = 90230
˜∗3 = 00030
Table 2: Parameter Calibration
Value of  in ()  = 3  = 5  = 7  = 8  = 9
True hyperbolic  = 44289  = 65019  = 77144  = 81250  = 84473
O1 QH 1 = 51299 1 = 75428 1 = 85732 1 = 88671 1 = 90819
O2 QH 2 = 47243 2 = 68079 2 = 79135 2 = 82974 2 = 85663
O3 QH 3 = 43584 3 = 63647 3 = 75680 3 = 79866 3 = 83205
Table 3: Laibson’s Consumption-Saving Model
Value of  in ()  = 3  = 5  = 7  = 8  = 9
True hyperbolic  = 28056  = 48041  = 61902  = 67400  = 72201
O1 QH 1 = 37039 1 = 55800 1 = 68219 1 = 73078 1 = 77313
O2 QH 2 = 31644 2 = 51128 2 = 64507 2 = 69801 2 = 74423
O3 QH 3 = 26888 3 = 46763 3 = 60855 3 = 66502 3 = 71452
Table 4: Internality Taxes
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 = 06
 = 04
 = 07
 = 03
 = 08
 = 02
 = 09
 = 01
 042347 047457 055683 07103
 035832 032508 028875 02490
Table 5: Optimal Policies with Markovian Uncertainty
 = 06
 = 04
 = 07
 = 03
 = 08
 = 02
 = 09
 = 01
 173622 197130 232089 289212
 142086 127444 112715 097869
 120654 114610 105950 930375
 129205 135063 143263 155097
Table 6: Equilibrium Strategies and Optimal Tax Rates with Markovian Uncertainty (Order-Two
Discounting)
 = 06
 = 04
 = 07
 = 03
 = 08
 = 02
 = 09
 = 01
 164293 187722 223735 284507
 133937 119758 105426 090993
 115220 109606 101516 893176
 123201 128651 136329 147554
Table 7: Equilibrium Strategies and Optimal Tax Rates with Markovian Uncertainty (Order-Three
Discounting)
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